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Abstract
The classification of smallpox by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as a 
Category A Bioterrorism threat agent has resulted in the U.S. Government investing significant 
funds to develop and stockpile a suite of medical countermeasures to ameliorate the consequences 
of a smallpox epidemic. This stockpile includes both vaccines for prophylaxis and antivirals to 
treat symptomatic patients. In this manuscript, we describe the path to approval for the first 
therapeutic against smallpox, identified during its development as ST-246, now known as 
tecovirimat and TPOXX®, a small-molecule antiviral compound sponsored by SIGA Technologies 
to treat symptomatic smallpox. Because the disease is no longer endemic, the development and 
approval of TPOXX® was only possible under the U.S. Food and Drug and Administration 
Animal Rule (FDA 2002). In this article, we describe the combination of animal model studies and 
clinical trials that were used to satisfy the FDA requirements for the approval of TPOXX® under 
the Animal Rule.
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1. The threat of smallpox: past, present, future
Smallpox is one of the most consequential infectious diseases in human history; estimates 
place the death toll in the 20th century alone at nearly 300 million. Mortality in smallpox 
epidemics has been historically around 33%. Attempts to control smallpox began with the 
practice of variolation, where infectious variola virus was inoculated in the skin or inhaled 
through the nose. Later, the discovery of vaccination by Edward Jenner as an effective 
prophylaxis against smallpox led, with its implementation, to reduced mortality in much of 
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the world. Advances in vaccine manufacture and stability led the World Health Organization 
(WHO) in the 1950s to initiate a campaign designed to eradicate smallpox through 
vaccination. This campaign, which was accelerated greatly in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
resulted in the declaration by WHO that smallpox was eradicated in May 1980 (Fenner et 
al., 1988). In the latter stages of the campaign, eradication of smallpox was accomplished by 
intense surveillance to identify and isolate cases combined with a focused vaccination 
campaign relying on ring vaccination of contacts and suspected contacts of symptomatic 
cases of smallpox. Although research on antiviral drugs during this timeframe identified 
compounds that showed efficacy against poxviruses in tissue culture or mice, none of the 
compounds demonstrated efficacy when used in patients with smallpox.
While variola virus no longer exists in nature, the possibility of preserved, unrecognized 
samples or clandestine stocks (Arita, 2014), the potential re-emergence from natural sources, 
and recent advances in synthetic biology describing the construction of horsepox virus de 
novo, demonstrating that smallpox virus could be constructed from chemical constituents 
(Noyce et al., 2018) mean the threat of the reemergence of smallpox is not zero. The only 
legal sources of variola are maintained by the governments of the United States and Russian 
Federation at WHO-sanctioned repositories, which contain stocks of Variola virus major in 
each country. The eradication of smallpox as a public health threat, the cost and effort 
associated with mass vaccination, and the serious and sometimes fatal complications 
associated with the replication-competent vaccines used during the eradication campaign, 
have led to a diminished public health justification for vaccination of the general population. 
However, should a smallpox release occur today, it would take place in an unprotected 
population in the absence of residual or “herd” immunity, meaning that much of the public 
will be susceptible to infection. The potential consequences of a smallpox epidemic in the 
present population has led the government of the United States to consider smallpox a high-
priority threat, tasking civilian and defense agencies to develop strategies and products to 
counter that threat.
2. The U.S. Government response to public health threats
2.1. Creation of novel infrastructure: the PHEMCE
To address the varied public health threats that could impact the U.S. population in the 21st 
century, the government has created a unique infrastructure primarily within the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) for the development of drugs, biologics, vaccines and 
devices to serve as medical countermeasures (MCM) against these threats. The agencies 
responsible for supporting the development of these products work in tandem through a 
cooperative enterprise known as the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures 
Enterprise (PHEMCE). Comprised of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority (BARDA), the National Institutes of Health (and primarily the National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Department of Defense (DoD), CDC, FDA, 
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the PHEMCE works to promote a 
streamlined approach to drug and device development aimed at addressing a wide range of 
national and health security threats.
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The PHEMCE is designed so that each step of medical countermeasure development is 
supported by the appropriate arm of the government. The early stages of product 
identification, proof of concept studies, and early clinical safety trials are supported by 
NIAID and DoD with FDA oversight. The support and development of products at the later 
stages of regulatory evaluation proved most difficult as the resources and acumen for 
manufacturing and late stage clinical trials were not available outside of the major 
pharmaceutical companies. Under the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act 
(PAHPA), since reauthorized as the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness 
Reauthorization Act (CR, 2013), BARDA was created to seek promising MCM candidates 
under development by NIAID or DoD and provide funding and support to carry out the late-
stage development and regulatory approval of MCMs so they could be stored by the US 
government for deployment in an emergency. Through funding provided under Project 
BioShield, BARDA, in coordination with sister agencies in the PHEMCE, has achieved the 
approval of over 40 products and has added a number of MCMs to the Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS).
2.2. The Animal Rule
Products for many of the threats the PHEMCE addresses are difficult to evaluate because the 
disease or syndrome is very rare or does not exist in nature. Traditional routes of regulatory 
evaluation are impossible because it is neither feasible to recruit sufficient numbers of 
patients into a clinical trial nor ethical to expose patients to these specific pathogens to test 
the efficacy of a drug, biologic or vaccine. In 2009, in an attempt to address this conundrum, 
FDA released guidance on a novel regulatory pathway established in 2002 called the FDA 
Animal Rule 21 CFR 314 Subpart I (Approval of New Drug When Human Efficacy Studies 
Are Not Ethical or Feasible) which was updated and further refined in 2015 (FDA, 2015). 
The Animal Rule allows sponsors to demonstrate a product’s efficacy in animal models in 
lieu of a human efficacy trial. When using the Animal Rule to evaluate products, all aspects 
of the regulatory evaluation of a product except for efficacy, such as safety and 
demonstration of good manufacturing practices, follow traditional product development 
pathways. Safety is demonstrated by a phase 3 clinical trial in healthy adults designed to 
detect adverse events at a rate appropriate for the product indication. The requirement for 
efficacy evaluation using animal models has led FDA to describe the characteristics needed 
for an animal model to provide support for the approval of a product. A relevant animal 
model must satisfy four requirements:
1. the disease and the mechanism by which the countermeasure reduces or prevents 
disease are both well-understood
2. countermeasure efficacy is demonstrated in one or multiple animal models that 
are considered to be well-characterized and adequate for demonstration of 
efficacy
3. efficacy endpoints in the animal model are clearly related to the desired outcome 
in humans such as improved survival or reductions in major morbidity, and
4. the human dose may be selected using data from animals treated at efficacious 
dose levels.
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2.3. Defending against a return of smallpox
The primary weapon in the armamentarium to respond to a smallpox emergency will be 
vaccines designed to protect the general population from infection if exposed to smallpox. 
Prophylactic vaccination will prevent the spread and therefore mitigate the magnitude the 
epidemic. The rare, but significant, adverse events associated with the replication competent 
vaccines against smallpox, combined with the cost of universal vaccination means that 
prophylactic universal vaccination is unlikely to be US policy, and in fact routine vaccination 
was discontinued in the US after 1972 (CDC, 1971). After one is exposed to variola, the 
ability of the vaccine to protect against smallpox drops off rapidly after a few days (Keckler 
et al., 2013) and since the response to a smallpox emergency among the civilian population 
will most likely occur after the detection of sentinel cases, there will be a cohort that can 
only be protected with a therapeutic countermeasure. Although there were no obvious 
candidates from the campaign to eradicate smallpox, advances in our understanding of 
poxvirus molecular biology, the development of high throughput screening, and the 
successful development of antiviral compounds to treat both RNA and DNA viruses led us to 
believe a similar approach would work on a virus that expressed over two hundred genes, 
and thus has numerous potential targets for direct antiviral intervention.
3. The discovery and early evaluation of TPOXX®
In early 2002, NIAID launched an initiative to identify smallpox drugs by evaluating 
libraries of compounds for the ability to interfere with the replication of vaccinia or cowpox 
in tissue culture. These viruses are similar to variola but can be studied at BSL-2 facilities. 
This “prescreen” was performed using libraries of compounds derived from already licensed 
products and libraries composed of novel chemical entities. Over 300,000 compounds were 
screened, with potential activity detected for nine chemical scaffolds (Jordan et al., 2010a). 
The best activity was observed for the tricyclononene carboxamides, and after testing 
analogs, the lead candidate, a 4-trifluoromethyl phenol derivative, was initially named 
ST-246 (Jordan et al., 2010a). One of the encouraging observations in the high throughput 
screening was the lack of cytotoxicity at the concentrations where the compound was active.
3.1. Antiviral activity and mechanism of action
The mechanism of action for TPOXX® was derived by incubating the drug and vaccinia 
virus in tissue culture at concentrations of the drug that allowed resistant virus to develop. 
Every resistant virus had a mutation that mapped to the gene corresponding to F13L in 
vaccinia Copenhagen. Surprisingly, the F13L protein is not required for replication of the 
virus but is observed during morphogenesis between the outer membrane of the intracellular 
infectious form of the virus and the new membrane derived from the trans-Golgi. The 
protein interacts with components of the trans-Golgi that wrap the infectious intracellular 
viral particles to form the triple-wrapped virus prior to transport to the cell surface and 
release. Poxviruses replicate by establishing cytoplasmic “factories” where abundant double-
membraned infectious virus is produced. Some of the infectious virus is converted into a 
triplewrapped form that fuses with the cellular membrane before release into the 
extracellular space. These extracellular viruses accelerate the spread of the infection both in 
vitro and in vivo. This mechanism for viral spread appears to be common to all 
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orthopoxviruses, as the F13L gene is highly conserved throughout all species. The antiviral 
activity observed in the tissue culture screening did not arise from inhibition of viral 
replication, but from inhibition of viral spread from cell to cell (Yuang et al, 2005; 
Grosenbach et al., 2011).
3.2. Initial studies in mouse models of orthopoxvirus infection
The ability of TPOXX® to treat poxvirus infections was tested in several lethal challenge 
mouse models in both immunocompetent and immunodeficient mice. Treatment of 
orthopoxvirus-infected immune compromised mice resulted in prolonged survival as long as 
the drug was present, but when treatment was stopped the disease reappeared and progressed 
to mortality. The drug was able to cure immunocompetent mice in that it slowed the spread 
of disease long enough for the host to mount an immune response and clear the virus. These 
results are consistent with its inhibitory effect of the virus through the interruption of the 
spread of disease, rather than through the inhibition of replication or destruction of the virus 
(Berhanu et al., 2009; Grosenbach et al., 2010; Zaitseva et al., 2013).
3.3. In vitro inhibitory activity against authentic variola virus
The first step in demonstrating the efficacy of TPOXX® against smallpox was the 
demonstration of the ability of TPOXX® to inhibit the spread of infection in tissue culture. 
The use of live variola virus is highly regulated, with only two sanctioned laboratories 
permitted to work with the virus, the CDC BSL-4 facility in Atlanta and a Russian 
Federation lab in Novosibirsk. Experiments can be performed only after gaining approval of 
research plans by the WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research (ACVVR). In 
order to demonstrate directly the antiviral activity of TPOXX® on variola virus, CDC 
petitioned WHO ACVVR and received permission to test the antiviral activity in vitro. 
TPOXX® was also tested in vitro against a virus stock derived from the central African 
isolate of monkeypox virus associated with substantial mortality in humans, to determine if 
the drug would be effective in limiting this human pathogenic poxvirus infection. The data 
from CDC evaluations confirmed that both viruses were susceptible to inhibition by 
TPOXX® (Smith et al., 2009).
3.4. Further evaluation under the Animal Rule
The demonstration of potent anti-poxvirus activity and the low level of cytotoxicity 
suggested that TPOXX® could be an excellent candidate therapeutic against smallpox. The 
regulatory evaluation of TPOXX® as a smallpox therapeutic required application of the FDA 
Animal Rule. Evaluation under the Animal Rule would require, in addition to the traditional 
manufacturing and clinical development steps necessary for drug development, the design 
and utilization of animal models for efficacy evaluation which meet the qualities spelled out 
in the Animal Rule guidance document. Meeting these conditions require an understanding 
of the disease and how it causes morbidity and mortality in both the animal model and 
humans, an ability to measure the drug exposures associated with efficacy, and a 
demonstration of efficacy in more than one animal model. Meeting these requirements 
increases the confidence that the animal model will be predictive of the ability of the 
countermeasure to affect the outcome of the disease in humans.
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3.4.1. Development of an animal model for smallpox—Although the last publicly 
acknowledged case of smallpox occurred in 1979, the observation of clinical cases during 
the latter stages of the eradication campaign demonstrated that smallpox was a systemic 
disease with an incubation period of 7–17 days followed by a prodromal fever preceding a 
synchronous centrifugal rash (Fenner et al., 1988). The rash pustules were active sites of 
viral replication and indicative of the severity of the systemic infection as patients with large 
numbers of lesions were less likely to survive. In the simplest sense, the outcome of the 
disease was the race between the ability of the systemic disease to kill the host and the 
ability of the host to generate an immune response that brings the viral infection under 
control. This is supported by the observation that the highest mortality occurred in 
populations with the least robust immune systems, such as pregnant women, the very young, 
and the elderly. The molecular basis for these observations was found with subsequent 
research on poxviruses which indicates their host range appears to be a function of the 
immunomodulatory gene products that each virus expresses and the interaction of these gene 
products with the host immune system. Variola virus encodes many proteins which appear to 
interfere with the normal immune response to infection in humans (Bratke et al., 2013).
In nature, variola virus has only been observed in humans, posing a challenge in establishing 
an animal model for the evaluation of MCMs to treat or prevent smallpox. The most obvious 
animal model to facilitate evaluation of TPOXX® against smallpox would be a nonhuman 
primate (NHP) infected with variola virus. Research done in the Soviet Union prior to the 
eradication of smallpox implied some higher apes were susceptible to smallpox and the U.S. 
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) team led by Drs. 
Peter Jahrling and John Huggins carried out a series of experiments at CDC exploring the 
feasibility of a NHP variola model. After a comprehensive set of experiments exploring 
different strains of variola virus, doses, and routes of administration, the difficulty in using 
this species for evaluation of smallpox countermeasures under the Animal Rule were 
apparent (Jahrling et al., 2004; Wahl-Jensen et al., 2011). Infection of cynomolgus macaques 
with variola virus at high doses, by aerosol to mimic natural exposure or by intravenous 
infusion, rarely resulted in illness or death. Fewer than half of the monkeys died at exposures 
of 1 × 108 pfu delivered intravenously. When the virus dose was increased to 1 × 109 pfu 
delivered intravenously all animals became sick and died but the resulting disease was 
emblematic of the rare, but universally fatal, hemorrhagic form of smallpox, or the rare form 
classified as flat smallpox, where in contrast to normal rash observed in most smallpox 
cases, the lesions expand to form a continuous unbroken pustule. Therefore, this model did 
not satisfy the criteria for relevance under the FDA Animal Rule since it would be difficult 
to demonstrate statistically relevant reduction in mortality without extremely large study 
groups and the disease, when fatal, did not resemble the typical clinical rash disease 
observed in most humans, calling into question the predictive value of this model. 
Experiments using TPOXX® in limited numbers of cynomologus macaques infected with 
variola were attempted (Huggins et al., 2009; Mucker et al., 2013). In these studies it was 
impossible to show a statistically meaningful improvement in mortality against smallpox 
since the group sizes were too small and some of the untreated animals survived. However, a 
reduction in lesion count and oral viral shedding was observed in treated animals, an 
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indirect, but encouraging, sign of efficacy as higher lesion count and viremia level were seen 
to be predictive of mortality in humans with smallpox (Fenner et al., 1988).
3.4.2. Use of nonhuman primate models of orthopoxvirus disease under the 
Animal Rule—During the early stages of product development for smallpox vaccines, the 
regulatory path for their evaluation was not established and efforts to develop models for 
evaluation of the vaccines under the FDA Animal Rule were explored. Using the intravenous 
challenge model used to test the efficacy of next generation vaccines (Earl et al., 2004) as a 
starting point, an interagency group was established and supported by NIAID to suggest 
lines of research and to evaluate potential animal models for regulatory use. In the end, this 
effort was not applied to the evaluation of smallpox vaccines since their evaluation was 
predicated on non-inferiority trials comparing their elicited immune response to vaccines 
with demonstrated efficacy against smallpox. However, the group pioneered many of the 
techniques subsequently used by product developers and BARDA to establish appropriate 
animal models for regulatory use including a central repository of a well-characterized 
challenge reagent, proficiency testing at multiple locations, and use of statistics to identify 
symptoms and triggers for medical intervention.
The animal model best characterized by this group, the intravenous challenge of cynomolgus 
macaques with monkeypox virus, became the central model used for TPOXX® development. 
The intravenous challenge model recapitulates the latter stages of a smallpox infection, 
essentially skipping the incubation period, by infecting with an intravenous bolus of 
monkeypox that disseminates systemically. The infected monkeys display a synchronous 
centrifugal rash approximately 4 days post infection, become feverish and progressively 
more ill, reaching euthanasia criteria around 10 days post-infection (Huggins et al., 2009). 
Since the intended indication for TPOXX® is as a therapeutic against smallpox, a model 
which establishes a systemic disease in monkeys similar to the latter stages of a smallpox 
infection is appropriate for evaluation of therapeutic efficacy. The high mortality and 
reproducibility of this model made it applicable to evaluation of TPOXX® under the Animal 
Rule.
Research with monkeypox requires BSL-3 containment. There is much greater capacity for 
animal research at facilities with BSL-3 containment rooms compared to variola virus 
research that can only be carried out at the CDC BSL-4 lab. The requirements for personal 
protection for BSL-4 research make studies meeting FDA requirements for good laboratory 
practices more difficult to carry out. In order to provide coverage long enough to ensure the 
host could mount an immune response, a 14-day treatment regimen was used beginning 
three or four days post-challenge. Initiation of treatment four days post-challenge was 
considered a therapeutic model of efficacy since all monkeys exhibited the rash diagnostic of 
smallpox infection in humans. A series of challenge studies using this model were supported 
by NIAID and DoD and carried out at the USAMRIID facilities at Fort Detrick. In these 
studies the effective dose of TPOXX® was determined and studies showing dose response, 
the effect of delaying treatment and the effect of shortening treatment duration were 
performed (Jordan et al., 2009; Huggins et al., 2009).
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4. The creation of BARDA and the further development of TPOXX
BARDA was created by Congressional legislation in 2007 to shepherd the late-stage 
development of MCMs and provide them in sufficient quantities to the SNS to address 
potential emergencies. BARDA achieves this through the establishment of public-private 
partnerships where BARDA provides funds and subject matter expertise to expedite the 
regulatory pathway for the MCM under development by a sponsor. One of the 
responsibilities assigned to BARDA was the development of therapeutic antivirals against 
smallpox. After releasing a request for proposals for smallpox antivirals, a contract was 
awarded to SIGA Technologies, Incorporated (New York, New York) in 2009 for the 
development and acquisition of a smallpox therapeutic. At the time of contract award, there 
were two main problems slowing the development of TPOXX®. The first problem was the 
optimization of the manufacture of TPOXX® and the second was the demonstration of 
efficacy under the existing animal models.
4.1. Optimization of manufacture
SIGA made significant advances while under NIAID support in establishing a reliable 
manufacturing process with defined starting materials. SIGA collaborated with the 
manufacturing subject matter experts at BARDA to optimize the process to ensure 
production of a single isomer at sufficient scale to meet the USG requirements for the SNS. 
In order to facilitate the response to large medical emergencies, Congress established a 
series of storage facilities called the SNS located across the United States to hold and 
distribute MCMs, devices, and equipment in an emergency. A MCM can be delivered to the 
SNS when the MCM has demonstrated sufficient safety and efficacy and good 
manufacturing practices (GMP) to allow distribution under an Emergency Use Authorization 
(EUA). The EUA is a regulatory mechanism allowing the distribution of MCMs after the 
declaration of a medical emergency by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The 
pre-EUA status is not considered a regulatory endpoint, but recognition of amassing 
sufficient data during pursuit of approval to allow widespread distribution without the level 
of informed consent and oversight expected in a clinical trial when a product is under 
Investigational New Drug (IND) status prior to approval. The FDA has regulatory 
mechanisms in place, such as the Emergency IND or Emergency Expanded Access 
Protocols to provide countermeasures under IND to a limited number of patients in an 
emergency (FDA,2018a). The effective response to some smallpox emergency scenarios 
would require the widespread distribution of TPOXX®. A package containing the safety data 
from the phase 1 safety trial, the efficacy data from the NHP monkeypox (MPOX) model, 
and the data demonstrating GMP from the engineering runs supported by BARDA was 
submitted to FDA by CDC since it is the USG agency expected to distribute the drug in an 
emergency. The first doses of TPOXX® were delivered to the SNS under pre-EUA in early 
2013.
4.2. Demonstration of efficacy under the Animal Rule
The second major hurdle for the development of TPOXX® was determining the path to 
demonstrate efficacy using animal models to satisfy the Animal Rule. The obvious problems 
with a variola virus challenge model meant that the only data supporting efficacy was from 
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the indirect evidence from the intravenous monkeypox virus challenge model. In order to 
solicit input on possible pathways for demonstrating efficacy for smallpox countermeasures 
under the Animal Rule, the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) 
organized an Antiviral Drugs Advisory Committee in December 2011, consisting of a panel 
of scientists and clinicians. The committee was asked to address the following agenda: “The 
committee will discuss pathways for the development of drugs intended to treat variola virus 
infection (smallpox) in the event of an outbreak, including the use of animal models of other 
orthopoxviruses (the group of viruses that includes smallpox) as potential evidence of 
efficacy”. Presentations were made to the panel describing the present status of research 
supporting the efficacy of TPOXX® and potential orthopoxvirus animal models by 
representatives from FDA, CDC, BARDA, NIAID, sponsors of smallpox countermeasures 
including SIGA, and members of the scientific community conducting orthopoxvirus 
research. The consensus of the committee was that models based on orthopoxvirus 
infections in susceptible hosts could be used to support the efficacy of countermeasures 
against smallpox. The committee also felt it was important to test the countermeasure in 
multiple models to increase confidence in its efficacy, particularly due to the difficulty in 
executing animal studies at BSL-4 facilities and the limitations of the variola virus challenge 
model.
The committee recommended further studies in three animal models: the monkeypox virus 
intravenous challenge model in NHPs developed by NIAID; the rabbitpox virus intradermal 
challenge model in rabbits; and the intranasal challenge model of ectromelia virus 
(mousepox) in Balb/C mice (FDA, 2011). At the time of the advisory committee meeting, 
the rabbit and mouse models had been described in reports in academic scientific journals, 
but had not been evaluated to see if they met the stringent standards required for evaluation 
of countermeasures under the Animal Rule. The application of multiple animal models to 
the evaluation of smallpox antivirals was only feasible if the mechanism of action of the 
countermeasure is the same in each model, the antiviral target gene product is conserved 
among the challenge viruses, and the activity of the countermeasure is not host-specific, all 
of which are true for TPOXX®.
Recognizing the critical role that animal models occupied in regulatory development, 
BARDA established a mechanism to develop animal models and carry out nonclinical 
studies in a product independent manner. A number of contract research organizations 
(CROs) were evaluated by BARDA for their ability to execute animal studies at a level 
commensurate for submission to FDA for product development. The eligible CROs could 
respond to task orders released by BARDA for solving specific nonclinical challenges. After 
the discussion at the Advisory Committee, contracts were awarded to members of this 
network to develop both the intradermal rabbitpox virus challenge model in rabbits and the 
intranasal ectromelia virus challenge model in mice. In both cases, the CRO used the 
published data describing the publication history of the models in the scientific literature 
(Adams et al., 2007; Parker et al., 2010) as a starting point and performed additional studies 
to determine if the models could serve to evaluate smallpox countermeasures under the 
Animal Rule. Characterization of the model included the use of uninfected animals during 
natural history studies to ensure potential symptoms of disease and triggers for medical 
intervention were reproducible, unambiguous and objective, the use of statistical evaluation 
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of these triggers, and the use of serial timed euthanasia and necropsy to follow the disease 
progression.
A pre-IND was established with CDER for protocol submission and feedback prior to study 
execution and a dialogue with CDER was maintained throughout the model characterization 
process including face-to-face meetings post-study to explain the results and solicit advice, 
resulting in both models achieving a level of stringency acceptable for product evaluation 
under the Animal Rule (Garver et al., 2016; Perry et al., 2018). The intent of the studies was 
to provide a framework of an animal model for any product developer to adapt to their 
needs. This approach saves time and money as it obviates the need for each product sponsor 
to develop an independent animal model. In addition, it provides the most humane approach 
since fewer animals will be used if the model is developed once and shared among product 
developers. BARDA did not use the data from the studies to solicit CDER for specific study 
designs, but instead provided the data to all developers so they could approach CDER and 
design an efficacy study with the appropriate triggers for medical intervention.
After discussions with CDER, SIGA Technologies decided to test the efficacy of TPOXX® 
using the rabbitpox virus intradermal challenge rabbit model as a second model to evaluate 
efficacy under the FDA Animal Rule in addition to the efficacy data already submitted using 
the MPOX model in NHPs. Rabbits were inoculated with a lethal dose of rabbitpox virus 
and four days post-challenge given placebo or 14 days of TPOXX®. Every animal treated 
with placebo reached pre-determined euthanasia criteria between days 5 and 10 post 
infection while nearly every rabbit that received TPOXX® survived at each of the four drug 
concentrations tested. At four days post challenge, all rabbits had fever and contained 
measurable levels of rabbitpox virus DNA in the blood. The two rabbitpox virus challenge 
studies and four TPOXX® efficacy studies in NHPs were performed under good laboratory 
practices (GLP), a level of documentation, data oversight, and monitoring equivalent to that 
expected for a clinical trial. A study run under GLP also utilizes validated assays and is 
subject to FDA inspection. This level of oversight is expected by FDA if an Animal Rule 
study is to be used as the basis of the efficacy data for the regulatory approval of any drug, 
including TPOXX®.
5. Establishing human dosage for the treatment of smallpox
The most difficult part of evaluating a drug for approval under the Animal Rule is arriving at 
a dose of the drug that is reasonably assumed to provide clinical benefit when used to treat 
the disease in humans. Regulatory evaluation using the Animal Rule still requires the 
demonstration of drug safety through clinical trials in healthy adults. The results from these 
trials, in conjunction with those from toxicology studies in animal models, help establish the 
limits of safety, and in doing so, define the upper limit of the human dose. Efficacy is 
demonstrated in animal models that satisfy the requirements of the FDA Animal Rule. The 
process used to establish an efficacious human dose through bridging efficacy and safety 
data is best summarized in the most recent version of the Animal Rule Guidance published 
by FDA in 2015 (FDA, 2015). This document describes in detail the process by which FDA 
was able to use the results from efficacy and safety studies to arrive at a dose for the 
approval of TPOXX®.
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5.1. Obtaining pharmacodynamic and pharmacokinetic data
The dose of a drug approved under the Animal Rule relies on good pharmacodynamics (pD) 
and pharmacokinetics (pK) data. The pK and pD of the drug can be easily measured in 
uninfected humans in clinical trials and in both uninfected and infected animals treated at 
multiple drug doses including that used to demonstrate efficacy. In the case of the evaluation 
of TPOXX® under the Animal Rule the arguably most important piece of data, the pK and 
pD of the drug in people infected with smallpox, are the only data that cannot be collected. 
The sponsor can triangulate between the pK data in uninfected and infected animals and 
uninfected humans to establish a human dose if the pK and pD parameters in infected 
animals are easily predicted from the observed exposures in the uninfected animals. If the 
pK data is the same in both infected and uninfected animals, it is reasonable to assume that 
the observed pK parameters in uninfected humans are a good estimate of drug exposures 
during infection. If the pK parameters are different in uninfected and infected animals, it 
may be impossible to predict the drug exposure in a human infected with the disease. For 
TPOXX®, the pK parameters were conserved between infected and uninfected animals.
5.2. Choosing an animal model for modeling the human dose
The second consideration for establishing the human dose is picking the appropriate animal 
model for dose selection. Since efficacy had been demonstrated in more than one animal 
model, FDA chose to model the human dose from the least favorable animal model, i.e. the 
animal model requiring the highest exposures as measured by pK and pD parameters to 
demonstrate efficacy. Analysis of the efficacy data by SIGA indicated that the mean steady 
state concentration, or maintaining a sufficiently high Cmin, was the most important correlate 
of efficacy. This association makes logical sense considering the mechanism of action for 
TPOXX® is blocking a viral-cellular protein interaction associated with the transition of 
infectious intracellular virus to an extracellular form of the virus that can exit the cell. Even 
a transitory drop in TPOXX® concentration could result in the production of the 
extracellular virus which could exit the cell and establish new independent infections since 
TPOXX® has no effect on virus entry or replication. The drug exposures required for 
efficacy in the NHP model, as determined by Cmin values were higher than those required 
for efficacy in rabbits. This is consistent with the biology of the challenge models, since the 
MPOX model, because of its intravenous route of challenge, establishes an immediate 
systemic infection which is treated four days later as lesions form, whereas the intradermal 
challenge in the rabbit model establishes a local infection, and symptoms for intervention 
arise coincident with the viral spread associated with the establishment of the systemic 
disease, slightly sooner than intervention in the MPOX model. Therefore, pK data in the 
NHPs was used to model the human dose (Jordan et al., 2009; Leeds et al., 2013).
5.3. Determining the human dose
The last consideration in assigning the appropriate human dose is the selection of a dose 
which can reasonably be expected to be effective since the pK and pD parameters exceed 
those measured at the effective dose in animal studies and is safe because the pK and pD 
parameters are lower than observed at the doses associated with adverse events, taking into 
account the data from clinical safety trials and toxicology studies. For TPOXX®, the only 
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disturbing safety signal was the observation of seizures in dogs at very high Cmax values. In 
a series of phase 1 clinical safety studies, TPOXX® was safe, with only mild adverse events 
detected at the tested doses and regimens. Another consideration in establishing the 
TPOXX® dose was food-related bioavailability, because the uptake of TPOXX® was 
approximately twice as effective when the patient took the drug while ingesting a meal with 
fat compared to the fasted state (Chinsangaram et al., 2012; Jordan et al., 2010b). The 
mortality data from dose-ranging efficacy studies in the MPOX model demonstrated that a 
statistically significant increase in survival was observed at doses at or above 3 mg/kg. When 
secondary endpoints, such as lesion count and viral load were also considered there was a 
dose dependent benefit that resulted in a reduction in disease severity at or above doses of 10 
mg/kg. The human dose was modeled after the more conservative 10 mg/kg treatment 
regimen associated with maximum clinical benefit. When SIGA modeled the human dose 
using a standard two compartment analysis, the data supported a human dose of 400 mg/day 
dose to provide everyone coverage equivalent to or higher than the 3 mg/kg dose in NHPs 
with a 600 mg/day dose providing similar exposures equivalent to the 10 mg/kg dose in 
NHPs (Amantana et al., 2013). The FDA modeling was consistent with these observations 
but in order to ensure adequate exposures, even in the fasted state, CDER suggested that 
SIGA run their pivotal safety trial at 600 mg given twice daily (bis in die, BID).
5.4. Performance of a pivotal safety trial
SIGA conducted a placebo-controlled safety trial in 449 adult volunteers, with 359 receiving 
TPOXX® at 600 mg BID. The pK data showed that, in a fed or fasted state, exposure levels 
exceeded the exposures observed in the 10 mg/kg dose in NHPs. Importantly, the pK 
parameter associated with efficacy, the Cmin, was 4-fold-8-fold higher in humans than in the 
MPOX model at a dose of 10 mg/kg. In addition to this study in healthy adults, SIGA 
executed a series of clinical trials in specific patient groups such as those with renal or liver 
deficiencies, performed drug-drug- interaction studies, and other studies that are part of a 
normal drug development pathway to inform FDA as to the proper use of the drug. The pK 
and pD results from the clinical trial were consistent with the expected values from the dose 
modeling performed by FDA ensuring that everyone will receive a drug exposure high 
enough to be effective and low enough to be safe.
6. Final evaluation and approval of TPOXX for the treatment of smallpox
CDER convened an Antimicrobial Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting (AMDAC) on May 
1, 2018 to evaluate the package of data associated with the development of TPOXX® 
(tecovirimat) and to address the question: “Based on the available data, does the risk-benefit 
profile of tecovirimat support its use for the treatment of human smallpox?” The committee 
was unanimous in its approval that TPOXX® was appropriate for treatment of smallpox. The 
majority of the session consisted of discussions focusing on the role of TPOXX® in a 
smallpox response such as post-exposure prophylactic use, its potential use with vaccination, 
and urging the medical community to acquire more information as to its utility in special 
populations such as pediatrics and pregnant women (FDA, 2018b). On July 13, 2018, FDA 
approved the license for TPOXX® as NDA 208,627 under the provisions of 21 CFR 314 
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Subpart I (Approval of New Drug When Human Efficacy Studies Are Not Ethical or 
Feasible).
7. Plans for the future
The approval of TPOXX® provides the public health community with a countermeasure to 
treat patients in a smallpox emergency that previously had no recourse. The studies 
performed during its development showed the wide applicability of the compound as it has 
demonstrable efficacy when used against monkeypox virus as a post-exposure prophylactic, 
and as a compassionate treatment for those experiencing adverse events from vaccination 
with vaccinia virus. BARDA and the USG are still supporting the development of smallpox 
antivirals since the approval of another smallpox therapeutic with an alternative mechanism 
of action would provide the opportunity for combination treatment to greatly reduce the 
chances that antiviral resistance will arise to reduce the effectiveness of treatment At present, 
SIGA has manufactured and delivered two million treatment courses of TPOXX® to the 
SNS with the last delivery occurring in September 2017. Presently, SIGA is developing 
alternative formulations of TPOXX® to treat dysphagic and pediatric populations and will 
continue to manufacture and deliver TPOXX® as required to the SNS to maintain 
preparedness.
8. Lessons learned from the development and approval of TPOXX
TPOXX® development was only possible through a collaborative effort including all 
members of the PHEMCE. The initial screening and identification of TPOXX® was 
spearheaded by CDC and NIAID; the early stages of product manufacture, the proof of 
concept animal studies, the development of a NHP animal model, and phase 1 studies were 
supported by NIAID through multiple grants and contract funds; the critical nonclinical 
studies to demonstrate efficacy were performed by DoD at USAMRIID facilities; and the 
support of GMP manufacturing, support of the clinical trials necessary to demonstrate safety, 
the development of the second animal model required to demonstrate efficacy were provided 
by BARDA. Even so, without the support of FDA through frequent interactions, including 
an Advisory Committee meeting canvasing the scientific community for appropriate animal 
models for efficacy evaluation, and discussions to design studies to inform the appropriate 
safe human dose, the approval of TPOXX® would not have been possible. It was only 
through the collaborative effort of the PHEMCE that SIGA was able to leverage the 
technical and financial expertise to negotiate the regulatory path and provide the American 
public with a new and vital addition to the armamentarium against smallpox (Grosenbach et 
al., 2018).
The approval of TPOXX® represents the first approval of a small molecule from discovery 
to licensure using the FDA Animal Rule. The development and addition of this therapeutic 
small molecule provides a vital tool in the USG response to a public health threat from 
smallpox as the cost of goods, stability, and operational advantages for distribution makes 
TPOXX® an ideal MCM in a smallpox emergency. The approval of TPOXX® provides a 
path, as circuitous as it may appear, for the approval of additional small molecules for public 
health response.
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